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SUPREME COURT FAILS TO HOLD VERTICAL
DIVISION OF TERRITORY ILLEGAL PER SE
White Motor Co. v. United States
372 U.S. 253 (1963)
The White Motor Company, a truck manufacturer, imposed territorial
and customer restrictions on its dealers and distributors and retained sped-
fied volume accounts for direct sale. The territorial agreements either pro-
hibited dealers and distributors from selling to customers located outside of
a specified geographical area or confined the dealers to a named customer
or customers. The restrictions precluding dealer sales to customers retained
by the manufacturer may be labeled customer restrictions and the others terri-
torial restrictions. Certain pricing policies were similarly imposed. The Justice
Department brought a civil antitrust suit to enjoin1 these restrictions as
contrary to sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act.2 On summary judgment
motion by the government the district court held3 that the restrictive agree-
ments and the price fixing provisions were illegal per se. The decision on
price fixing was not appealed. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority
of the Supreme Court,4 held that whether the restraints are illegal per se or
whether they might be found ancillary to a reasonable business practice
could only be determined after the inquiry of a trial on the merits.5 The
bare bones of the evidence before the Court were insufficient to describe the
economic character of such agreements. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in
the result, distinguished customer restrictions from territorial restrictions6
for the benefit of the court below. He diagramed the various types of terri-
torial restraints possible and concluded that at least some might be justifiable
as reasonable business practices. The customer restrictions were categorized
as seemingly more dangerous and probably less capable of being rationalized.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Clark in turn characterized the arrangement laid
bare by the record as "one of the most brazen violations of the Sherman Act
that I have experienced in a quarter of a century. ' ' 7 He found no room for "the
rule of reason" where agreements are made solely for the purpose of elimi-
1 Under § 4 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4
(1958).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1958).
3 United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
4 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
5 The definitions of per se rules, the rule of reason, de minimis, ancillary restraints,
their history and interrelationship, are discussed in Neale, "The Antitrust Laws of the
U.S .." 13-23, 424-433 (1960).
6 In one county White assigned all the customers in the county to one dealer except
for one customer who was assigned as the only customer of a second dealer and another
customer who was retained by White for direct sale. Mr. Justice Brennan lumps the
assignment of geographic areas and customers together as territorial restrictions. He classi-
fies the retention of customers by the manufacturer as a customer restriction.
7 White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 4, at 276.
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nating competition and he concluded that the majority opinion had no value
as precedent in substantive antitrust law8 and would only permit the truck
manufacturer to enjoy the fruits of its illegal conduct for a few more years.
This is the first case before the Supreme Court concerning the question
of vertical division of territories.9 At the present time the Court refuses
to consider agreements effecting such division as illegal per se, but there
is no barrier to the emergence of a per se rule at some future time after
consideration of other cases. It is significant that the Court did squarely
consider the vertical division separately from the price fixing issue in the
lower court.' 0 Although White did not contest the district court opinion on
price fixing, it would not have been difficult for the court to consider the
designation of territories and customers as an integral part of the illegal price
fixing scheme."
8 The case arose upon a motion for summary judgment governed by Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A proposed amendment to this rule includes a
requirement of affidavits from the adverse party setting forth facts showing that there
is genuine issue for trial. White was not required to do so under the old rule, and the
need for remand arose from the insufficiency of the record. The amendment is submitted
to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and will probably take effect in the near
future. The amendment will eliminate the problem of the sufficiency of the record.
o In Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943) exclusive territories were held legal. Yet in Boro Hall there
was no prohibition against selling to any customer. The restraint involved only the loca-
tion of sales facilities. Such arrangements normally permit abundant intrabrand competi-
tion as opposed to the restrictions of White.
10 At least two writers bad reservations as to whether this issue would be separately
considered. See Kaapcke, "How to Distribute Your Products," 1962 N.Y. State Bar
Association Antitrust Symposium 55, 59, and Day, "Exclusive Territorial Arrangements
Under The Antitrust Laws-Reappraisal," 40 N.C.L. Rev. 223, 244-245 (1962). Kaapcke
counseled marketers to avoid any kind of territorial security other than assigning areas
or customer classes of "primary responsibility" for distribution and sales promotion. He
concluded that this arrangement alone would be satisfactory to the Antitrust Division
and the Federal Trade Commission under the authority of United States v. Philco Corp.
(E.D. Pa. 1956), 1956 Trade cases, #68409 and Snap-On Tools Corps,, F.T.C. Docket
71116. Since the Court still has not passed on this question other than to separate it
from the price-fixing provisions the advice is still pertinent. See also Rifkind, "Division
of Territories" from Van Cise and Daum, "How to Comply with Antitrust Laws," and
Robinson, "Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods," 45 Cornell L.Q.
254 (1960).
The area of primary responsibility concept is based on the Colgate doctrine, United
States v. Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), which allows a marketer to announce
the conditions on which he will continue to deal with other parties and to discontinue
his dealings if these conditions are not fulfilled. For a summary of advice to marketers
see 60 Mich. L. Rev. 1006, note 15 and accompanying text (1962).
11 In Snap-On Tools, supra note 10, the FTC held that territorial restraints were an
integral part of illegal price-fixing and inseperable as a second issue. In United States v.
Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) the Court expressed disfavor toward
customer restrictions but considered them to be bound up in a system of retail price
maintenance.
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The distinction between territorial and customer restrictions is important.
Territorial restrictions of assignment of territories among dealers by a
manufacturer seemingly involves no agreement between competitors.12 How-
ever, a customer restriction, i.e., an agreement between a dealer and a manu-
facturer to divide business between themselves is clearly an agreement be-
tween actual or potential competitors to divide a portion of the market.13
The Court should have experienced no difficulty in pronouncing the latter
class of agreements as illegal per se under authority of Addyston Pipe'4
and other cases involving a horizontal division of territory., To volume
customers both White and a competing dealer or distributor would appear to
be on the retail level. 16
Whether or not a manufacturer may divide customers and territories
among his dealers and distributors is a more troublesome issue. There is
no comparison between vertical and horizontal division of territories. There
is no agreement between competitorsiT in .a vertical division and the manu-
facturer has an independent competitive purpose in making a vertical divi-
sion. The analogy of vertical division of territories to resale price mainte-
nance' 3 is more helpful, but a manufacturer has a high stake in securing
12 There is no direct agreement between the dealers and distributors, but they all
know that the other dealers and distributors are agreeing to the same conditions. "Con-
scious parallelism" has in at least one important case been held to be agreement. See
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); but see Theatre Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) and P. W. Cook, Jr.,
"Fact and Fancy on Identical Bids," 41 Harv. Bus. Rev. 67 (1963). For an exhaustive
discussion of "conscious parallelism" see Turner, "The Definition of Agreement Under
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655
(1962).
13 United States v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 312 (1956) and
United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. Minn. 1945), are
directly in point. Mr. Justice Brennan agrees in the instant case that an agreement
between a manufacturer and a dealer that the dealer will not sell to an account retained
for direct sale by the manufacturer is an agreement between competitors to divide a
portion of the market, but adds a further requirement that the agreements should actually
foreclose competition. He reasons that if the dealers and distributors would be unable
to compete anyway then the agreements do no more than codify the obvious. However,
effect on competition is not the sole criteria as to whether there is a violation of the
Sherman Act. An anti-competitive purpose should be enough, see discussion on intent in
Neale supra note 5, at 429-430. These agreements can have no other purpose than to fore-
dose competition. A dealer who cannot compete now might be able to enlarge his
operations to competitive status if the stultifying restraint were removed. The present
reasonableness of a restriction may be future unreasonableness. .See United States v.
Trenton Potteries Company, 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
'4 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
15 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States
v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
16 See cases cited supra note 13.
17 See discussion and cases cited supra note 12.
1 In the district court the instant case was primarily decided by analogizing it to
the leading case in retail price maintenance, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons, 220
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effective distribution of his product by territorial restraints while he has little
interest in maintaining its resale price. It may be easier for a dealer to sell
to the more desirable accounts in another territory after he has sold the
more desirable in his own than to exploit the less attractive accounts at
home.' 9 The manufacturer loses sales, and the dealer in the raided territory
is weakened or competitively destroyed with a corresponding detriment to
local sales and service. The raided dealer often must pay extensive servicing.
installation, local advertising and sales costs2 ° which the raider is avoiding
by selling outside his territory. Arguably the interests of the manufacturer
and the public will be served by some form of territorial restraint, but the
nature of the restraint is crucial. The uncompromising revocation of a fran-
chise may protect the manufacturer but unduly and unnecessarily restrict
competition.
Manufacturers have legal means to protect themselves and their dealers
without eliminating intrabrand competition. A manufacturer may announce
a refusal to deal with a distributor or dealer who fails to develop and service
its territory in a satisfactory fashion.2 It can combat the undesirable effects
of "cream skimming" by means such as a partial "profit passover."22 A local
dealer with out-of-pocket expenses for servicing or installation could be re-
imbursed by the raiding dealer. The manufacturer is assured of service and
customers are assured of competition. The local dealer has no advantage
over his intrabrand competitors except the normal advantage of location.
Any dealer attempting to charge a price unwarranted by its costs and a
reasonable profit is subject to intrabrand competition from other dealers.2 3
The foreign dealer's penalty is only its normal expenses in its own territory.
In that there are reasonable alternatives, absolute restraints should be illegal
per se.2 4 Refusals to deal with unproductive dealers are legal, and a moderate
U.S. 373 (1911). In Dr. Miles, the Supreme Court realized that a vertical imposition of
prices by marketer on his buyers would have the same effect as an agreement betweea
the buyers to sell at the identical price. The Court reasoned that price-fixing agreements
between competitors were illegal and that this agreement with the same effect should
be illegal also.
19 See Notes, "Restricted Channels of Distribution," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 811
(1962).
20 Id. at 811-13.
21 See the discussion on the areas of "primary responsibility," supra note 10.
22 A profit passover is an enforcement device whereby a raiding dealer pays all or
part of his profits on any sale outside his assigned territory to the raided dealer. See
Notes, "Restricted Channels of Distribution," supra note 19, at 814-817.
23 Ibid.
24 Whether a practice is ancillary to a legitimate business purpose is determined
"by considering whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the
interests of the party in favor of whom it is given and not so large as to interfere with
the interests of the public." Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, supra note
14, at 282. Since a manufacturer may fairly protect his interests by means not affecting
competition then the reasoning of the district court in the instant case should apply. See
the rationale of the district court, supra note 18.
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restraint such as a partial profit passover 25 could serve to strengthen manu-
facturers and dealers with a corresponding de minimis effect26 on competition.
However, the main thrust of the appellant's argument remains -un-
answered. White contended that its small size made territorial restraints
necessary if it were to compete with its giant rivals. A new entrant or a small
expanding producer may be unable to acquire satisfactory outlets for its
products unless it insulates its distributors against intrabrand competition. 27
These circumstances offer more opportunity for a "rule of reason" inquiry
because freedom of entry is a highly sanctioned objective of antitrust law.23
Normally an oligopolistic producer has no problem of access to the market,
and the "rule of reason" inquiry may be safely restricted to non-oligopolistic
industries and to small producers in industries dominated by giants.29 The
disconcerting aspect of allowing the "rule of reason" test to operate under
the facts of White is the reason behind its need. Here, as in the area of resale
price maintenance, the motivating force behind the agreement is coercion
by the dealer. Manufacturers promise to punish price cutters because other
dealers will not buy from them if they refuse to do so. New entrants or
small producers must promise to enforce territorial restrictions because
dealers will not handle their products without restrictions. However, price
maintenance and vertical division of territories are distinguishable. The usual
purpose of resale price maintenance is to protect dealers from competition in
goods that are readily saleable and already highly competitive with other
brands.80 The public has no interest in maintaining high prices,3 1 but a
public purpose is served by encouraging more competitors. In this context the
superior bargaining power of the dealer should be overlooked if the restrictive
practice will be carried on only for a reasonable length of time.3 2 Within a
215 See text accompanying notes 21 and 22 supra.
20 In United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 49 (1948), the court accepted a de
minimis argument. Although this case was subsequently overruled by amendment to
the Clayton Act, its holding is still valid in a Sherman Act case. Enforcement measures
designed only to reimburse a local dealer for his out of pocket expenses would only
restrain competition to the extent of the local dealer's location advantage. Such a slight
effect can be safely labeled as de minimis.
27 See "Legality of Territorial Franchises Argued in Supreme Court" (a summary
of the oral arguments in the instant case), 80 BNA Antitrust and Trade Reg. A-i, A-9
(January 22, 1963).
28 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430-431 (1945).
29 But see Kaiser and Turner, "Antitrust Policy," 142-144 (1959). The authors set
up criteria for the pronouncement of per se rules. One condition is that the prohibited
practice must be an instance of business conduct unrelated to market situation. They
argue that a per se rule can only be fair if it is something that could have been voluntarily
avoided, yet market position is usually obvious to everyone, especially to a firm in the
market, and such a firm should have no difficulty in determining whether its position
has reached oligopolistic proportions.
80 See Jordon, "Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws,"
9 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 111, 120-121 (1962).
81 Ibid.
82 United States v. American Can, 87 F. Supp. 18 (1949), involved a tying contract
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reasonable time a new entrant should become well enough established to
acquire or retain sales outlets without luring prospective dealers by a promise
of a protected territory. A new entrant or a small expanding producer should
not receive special treatment for an extended period of time by virtue of
smallness alone.33 The manufacturer's legitimate interest in having his terri-
tory well covered may be insured by a refusal to deal with a dealer who
does not develop his territory well 4 Where a dealer can realize full potential
from his own territory, yet still sell outside then the manufacturer can pre-
vent the undesirable effects of "cream skimming" by the de minimis re-
striction such as a partial profit passover.35 All of the above considerations
will have to be developed at the trial of this and similar cases.
and F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Advertisers, 344 U.S. 392 (1953) involved an exclusive
dealing contract. Under the facts of each case the respective courts held that the present
arrangements were illegal, but approved them if they were restricted to a period of one
year.
33 Whether White is a small producer is dubious. White ranks 118 of the 500 largest
corporations in the United States. See Fortune, July, 1963. White advertises itself as the
world's leading producer of heavy duty trucks. In 1962 White sold 15,000 trucks with
a rating of 19,500 lbs. G.V.W. or more. Trucks of this rating or above are considered
heavy duty trucks. International Harvester sold 46,000; General Motors 16,000; Ford
20,000; and Mack 9,000. See 1963 Fleet Reference Annual, Commercial Car Journal.
34 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
35 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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